Intelligence: Mid-July Review

BDD

Through the use of compartment strategies comprised of different political and socio-economic core groups, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) attempts to achieve a comprehensive goal: solidifying its rule and power in Burma.

By establishing the SPDC’s cronies, including pro-SPDC civil society groups, as the “legal” political parties for the sham 2010 Election in Burma, the SPDC will rig the Election results and ensure that only cronies “win” seats in the 2010 Election. Because 25% of the representatives must be uniform military congressmen, the SPDC will register pro-SPDC groups as political parties so that they can control the remaining 75% of the seats. Thus, the SPDC will fix the process as well as the results and prevent anti-SPDC and pro-democracy groups from winning any seats. Therefore, the SPDC will solidify its rule.

The SPDC is engineering the sham “election process” by encouraging cronies to become political parties so that they can “build the country post-election.” Additionally, the SPDC is pushing ceasefire groups to enter these “party politics” in order to prevent potential threats. However, ceasefire groups must obey all orders from the Commander in Chief, and the new sham constitution allows only one army in Burma. Therefore, to maintain existence after the 2010 Election, ceasefire groups may only exist as political parties, as they will likely become localized under the Burma army.

Cyclone Nargis has revealed the SPDC’s two conflicting ideologies. One SPDC faction believed that prohibiting international assistance would increase internal dissatisfaction; whereas, using UN-ASEAN humanitarian aid would foster political legitimacy prior to the 2010 Election. However, the other SPDC faction believed in nationalism and national pride and in prohibiting international humanitarian assistance programs.

This hardliner faction promoted “self-sufficient” programs by internal donors. They used TV and SPDC-controlled media and journals to showcase their “domestic” and “self-reliant” programs in order to falsely claim that they could handle Cyclone Nargis relief efforts domestically and without international assistance.

Slowly, the SPDC has gained international support for its Nargis recovery efforts. Looking ahead to the 2010 Election, the compartment strategy group led by U Aung Thaung, Major General Khin Ye, Major General Kyaw San, received praise and gained support from Senior General than Shwe.

However, evidence demonstrates the SPDC’s internal conflicts and factions. For example, last month, the former Lieutenant General Ye Myint’s anger and frustration sparked a crisis within the SPDC. The exposure of his family’s involvement with the illicit drug trade in Burma has the potential to foster a future power struggle or palace coup. Now, sources said SPDC has considered post Than Shwe’s political consequences.

As history has shown, the family of the late dictator Ne Win was sentenced to death when the late General Ne Win’s grandson insulted General Maung Aye’s daughter. Twenty years ago, a local teashop dispute changed Burma’s entire political landscape by sparking the 1988 nationwide uprising. Only time will tell what will result from the internal power struggles that the SPDC faces today.